This book systematically presents the main solutions of cooperative games thecore bargaining set kernel nucleolus and the Shapley value of TU games andthe core ... » 

This book systematically presents the main solutions of cooperative games thecore bargaining set kernel nucleolus and the Shapley value of TU games andthe core the Shapley value and the ordinal bargaining set of NTU games. Toeach solution the authors devote a separate chapter wherein they study itsproperties in full detail. Moreover important variants are defined or evenintensively analyzed. The authors also investigate in separate chapterscontinuity dynamics and geometric properties of solutions of TU games. Thestudy culminates in uniform and coherent axiomatizations of all the foregoingsolutions excluding the bargaining set. Such axiomatizations have notappeared in any book. Moreover the book contains a detailed analysis of themain results on cooperative games without side payments. Such analysis is verylimited or nonexistent in other books on game theory. TOCIntroduction. TUGames Coalitional TU Games and Solutions. The Core. Bargaining Sets. ThePrekernel Kernel and Nucleolus. The Prenucleolus. Geometric Properties ofthe eCore Kernel and Prekernel. The Shapley Value. Continuity Propertiesof Solutions. Dynamic Bargaining Procedures for the Kernel and the BargainingSet. NTU Games Cooperative Games in Strategic and Coalitional Form. The Coreof NTU Games. The Shapley NTU Value and the Harsanyi Solution. The ConsistentShapley Value. On the Classical Bargaining Set and the MasColell BargainingSet for NTU Games. Variants of the DavisMaschler Bargaining Set for NTUGames. «