Endogenous election timing allows leaders to schedule elections when the timeis right. The author proposes and tests an informational theory of endogenouselecti... » 

Endogenous election timing allows leaders to schedule elections when the timeis right. The author proposes and tests an informational theory of endogenouselection timing that explains when leaders call for elections and theconsequences of their decisions. In particular he argues that if all else isequal leaders announce elections when they anticipate a decline in theirfuture performance. As a consequence early elections signal a leaders lack ofconfidence in future outcomes. The earlier elections occur relative toexpectations the stronger the signal of demise. Using data on Britishparliaments since 1945 the author tests hypotheses related to timing ofelections electoral support and subsequent economic performance. Leaders whocall elections early relative to expectations experience a decline in theirpopular support relative to preannouncement levels experience worse postelectoral performance and have shorter campaigns. «